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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECT OF NUTRITION LABELLING ON FAST-FOOD NUTRITIONAL
CONTENT
MAY 2020
JOSHUA J REED, B.A. THE COLLEGE OF NEW JERSEY
M.S. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Nathalie Lavoie and Professor Emily Wang

Abstract: The United States has implemented many policies to target obesity. Recently,
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration has mandated that restaurants must label the
calorie content of the food they provide on menus and menu boards. Previous literature
suggests that this policy will cause a small subset of consumers to improve the nutritional
quality of the food they consume. Restaurants’ responses to the policy are not as well
studied but existing literature suggests that menu items become slightly healthier after the
introduction of various local policies. This paper seeks to assess the impact of a
nationally-instituted nutrition labelling policy on fast-food nutritional content. We find
evidence that restaurants both improve the healthfulness of pre-existing food items and
introduce new food items of substantially lower nutritional quality.
Disclaimer: Part of this thesis was written in collaboration with my advisors, Dr.
Nathalie Lavoie, and Dr. Emily Wang, in the context of a grant proposal. The data
collection process was done in large part by Dr. Qihong Liu.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Obesity is now widely acknowledged as a leading public health crisis affecting the
United States and much of the developed world. It is estimated that obesity imposes a social
cost of $117 billion in the United States alone (Komesaroff and Thomas, 2007). The U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services found a prevalence of obesity of about 40
percent in adults and 19 percent in youths, and this prevalence has been steadily increasing
(Hales et al, 2017). Poor diets are a key contributing factor to obesity (Lin and Guthrie,
2012), which in turn is linked to mortality from heart disease, stroke, and type 2 diabetes
(Micha et al., 2017). Broadly separating individual’s diet into two components, food-athome and food-away-from-home, our proposed research focuses on effect of policies
intended to decrease obesity on the latter with this paper focusing specifically on fast-food.
Food-away-from-home (FAFH) has taken increasing importance in our diet. Spending
on FAFH first surpassed spending on food at home in 2010 (Saksena et al., 2018) and in
2019, the industry took in an unprecedented $863 billion in revenue (Nation’s Restaurant
News). This figure out competes the total revenue in grocery sales, $674 billion, by nearly
$200 billion, speaking to the importance of food-away-from-home. The increasing
importance of FAFH is magnified by its nutritional profile, i.e., poorer quality and more
caloric than food at home. It contains more saturated fats and sodium, and less calcium,
iron, and fiber than food at home (Saksena et al., 2018).
As consumer preferences shift, restaurants are coming under increasing examination
regarding the nutritional quality of the products they offer. Between 1977 and 2008,

1

Americans increased their away-from-home caloric intake from 18 percent to 32 percent
(Lin and Guthrie, 2012). Restaurants have increased in importance to American diets and
this trend is likely to continue. Given this, the role of FAFH in obesity is important to
consider.
This thesis assesses fast-food restaurants’ strategic responses to policy that requires
overt disclosure of nutritional content of their menu items. Specifically, when they are
required to label calories next to menu items on menus and menu boards. We find evidence
that firms reformulate items to be more healthful and introduce new items which are less
healthful. One potential explanation for this pattern is that firms want to appeal to both
health-conscious consumers and to consumers who prefer taste over nutritional quality.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND
One potential remedy to the obesity and general poor diet crisis facing the United
States is labelling nutritional information to inform consumers about their dietary choices.
Pre-packaged foods sold in grocery stores have held a nutrition labelling requirement since
the passage of the Nutrition Labelling and Education Act of 1989-90 (H.R.3562). A
retrospective FDA (2018a) review of this policy found that benefits, in the form of gains
to consumer welfare, have exceeded costs, in the form of regulatory impositions. Recently,
a similar policy of nutrition labelling was enacted for restaurants.
On May 7th, 2018, a policy of nutrition labelling on menus and menu boards in
restaurants was enacted nationally (FDA, 2018b). This paper seeks to assess the impact of
the nationally instituted nutrition labelling policy on the nutritional quality of food offered
in U.S. restaurants.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act signed into law on March 23rd,
2010, mandated nutrition labelling in restaurants as a national policy (42 U.S.C. § 18001).
Of interest to this paper is section 6205 which, required the FDA to implement a rule for
restaurants to:
1.

Label calorie counts adjacent to the relevant item’s name on their menu.

2.

Succinctly state the daily reference value (DRV) of calorie intake (2,000

calories) on their menu.
3.

Provide consumers with more detailed nutritional information in written

form at the restaurant and display availability of this information on their menu.
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These rules apply to standard menu items at restaurants and similar retail food
establishments; notably, restaurant chains with fewer than 20 locations are exempt from
this regulation. Additionally, the rule does not apply to items not listed on the menu (e.g.
condiments), daily specials, temporary menu items (appearing for less than 60 days per
calendar year), custom orders, or items that are part of a customary market test (appearing
for less than 90 days). However, self-service food items must be labeled at the point of
service (42 U.S.C. § 18001, Sec. 4205).
Implementing this policy proved to be quite controversial and lobbyists managed
to have it postponed twice (Bokamp, 2017). Critics claimed that the regulation is not
flexible enough for restaurants that conduct most of their business through delivery and
imposes unjustified costs (Bokamp, 2017). Advocates claimed it is vital and relatively
simple for consumers to be informed of the nutritional content of their food (Bokamp,
2017). A lengthy review of the potential costs and benefits of the policy found substantial
benefits for minimal costs (FDA, 2011). Eventually, it was instituted by the FDA on May
7th, 2018 (FDA, 2018b).
Fast-food is a major industry in the United States generating $273.2 billion in
revenue in 2019, according to a report by IBIS World (Hyland, 2019). Over the past 5 years
the industry has experienced substantial growth and is projected to continue growing but
at a slower rate for the next 5 years. Fast-casual restaurants, such as 5 Guys and Chipotle,
which offer higher quality food and a more attractive atmosphere have steadily been
gaining market share. Nevertheless, the market is still dominated by large traditional
restaurant chain franchisors: The McDonald’s Corporation, The Wendy’s Company, Yum!

4

Brands Inc. (KFC, Taco Bell, and Pizza Hut), Restaurant Brands Inc. (Burger King and
Popeyes), Domino’s Pizza Inc., and Chick fil-A (Hyland, 2019).
Fast food restaurants are generally divided into six subtypes: Burger (34.3 percent
of fast food restaurants), Sandwiches (11.3 percent), Chicken (10.3 percent), Ethnic (9.1
percent), Pizza and Pasta (8.8 percent) and Other (26 percent) (Hyland, 2019). These
categorizations are consistent with those used by Nations Restaurant News magazine
(2019), a well-known industry publication and a useful source for categorizing individual
restaurants.
Individual fast-food restaurants are mostly financed and managed by smallbusiness franchisees, 94.2 percent of establishments have fewer than 50 employees
(Hyland, 2019). Despite the decentralized nature of fast food restaurant ownership, the
franchisors of large restaurant chains exercise almost complete control over the food
offered in their restaurants (Miles, 2018). Large restaurant chains usually have national
supply arrangements for all their inputs and franchisees are often prohibited from
purchasing any inputs by other means (Miles, 2018). The nature of franchise agreements
allows franchisors a high degree of flexibility to change menus and have those changes
implemented across franchises.
A study conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) found that fastfood has continually increased in importance to American diets (Lin and Guthrie, 2012).
Americans consume 13 percent of their calories at fast-food restaurants, the largest subset
of food away from home, increasing from 3 percent in 1977-78. Additionally, food
prepared away from home has been found to have significantly lower nutritional quality
than food prepared at home. The authors discuss nutrition labelling in restaurants as a
5

feasible remedy to the poor nutritional quality of food prepared away from home. They
note that nutritional labelling may incentivize consumers to choose healthier options and
restaurants to offer them. However, people’s food choices may not be entirely rational,
based more on hunger and sensual pleasure than nutrition (Lin and Guthrie, 2012). It is
evident that any policy which seeks to address the growing issue of poor nutrition and
obesity in the United States must focus on food away from home and, specifically, fast
food. What is less clear is whether nutrition labelling is an effective policy to combat this
issue.
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CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW
There are two potential actors who could change their actions in response to
nutrition labelling in restaurants, the consumers, and the restaurants themselves. Most of
the existing literature on this topic focuses on consumer responses to nutrition labelling. In
general, it finds that consumers respond to the policy by slightly reducing their calorie
intake and intake of other overconsumed nutrients.
Bollinger, Leslie, and Sorenson (2010) had access to detailed purchase data from
Starbucks and used it to provide an important addition to the literature. The authors utilize
a difference-in-difference design to assess the impact of a New York City (NYC) menu
labelling regulation 3 months before and 11 months after its implementation. This NYC
policy was similar to the now nationally mandated policy. They find that calories per
transaction fall by approximately 6 percent in NYC relative to Philadelphia and Boston.
However, calorie reductions are limited to food items, not beverages. Furthermore,
although the reduction in calories is significant, it is small and would only translate to a
small decrease in obesity. Additionally, there is a degree of heterogeneity of the effect of
posting the calorie information; college educated people, women, and people with higher
incomes were more likely to consume fewer calories (Bollinger, Leslie, and Sorenson,
2010). Overall, this study presents a clear example of calorie labelling decreasing calorie
consumption by some consumers in a market setting.
Green, Brown, and Ohri-Vachaspati (2015) examine the socio-demographic
disparities and the likelihood of customers using McDonald’s internally mandated calorie
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menu labels. The study found that more educated and higher income individuals were
significantly more likely to report using calorie labels and reduce their calorie intake
(Green, Brown, and Ohri-Vachaspati, 2015). Ebel et al. (2009) study the purchasing
decisions of adults in low-income neighborhoods in New York City when presented with
a locally instituted policy which is like the now nationally implemented policy. Many
people reported that they noticed the menu labels and, as a result, reported purchasing fewer
calories. However, their purchase decisions were not significantly different from those who
did not notice the labels (Ebel et al. 2009). Yamamoto et al. (2004) conducted a similar
experiment and find that when young subjects are presented with menus with and without
calorie labels, they significantly reduced their calorie intake. While many consumers are
not very well informed on how to use nutritional information to better their dietary choices,
this misinformation is differentially distributed across demographics.
It has been firmly established by previous literature that nutrition labelling on
menus and menu boards does cause some consumers to notice and respond to the labels by
choosing healthier options. A meta-analysis of recent studies has affirmed this conclusion,
finding reductions of 77.8 kcal consumed per consumer because of nutrition labelling
policy (Littlewood et al., 2015). However, this effect is heterogenous across demographics.
Furthermore, effects are not large enough to translate to a real change in obesity. What is
not so well established is the firms’ responses to changes in consumer preferences when
they are mandated to display calorie content information. The few studies that have been
done on locally implemented policies suggest a modest improvement in the nutritional
quality of menu items after the policies went into effect.
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Namba et al. (2013) is one such study that focused on fast food restaurant chains.
They observe 5 treatment chains who operated in areas which required nutrition labelling,
between 2005 and 2011, and 4 which did not. Menu labelling requirements began with the
implementation of the NYC policy in 2008. They observed the proportion of food items
that were “healthier” based on DRV for a 2,000-calorie diet, U.S. FDA guidelines, and the
dietary guidelines for Americans from the USDA. The authors found that restaurants which
were subject to the nutrition labelling policy began offering a significantly higher
proportion of “healthier” menu items after being subject to the policy. (Namba et al. 2013).
Breummer, Krieger, Salens, and Chan (2012) utilized a sample of restaurants in
King County, Washington which instituted a similar policy to the now national policy in
2009. The authors observed calorie counts of restaurant entrées before and after the policy
went into effect. They found significant, but small, differences in the calorie content of
fast-food menu items after the policy went into effect. Additionally, they observed
saturated fat and sodium but did not find many significant differences. Overall, larger
reductions were observed at sit-down than fast-food restaurants (Breummer, Krieger,
Salens, and Chan, 2012). These studies observed calorie reductions from locally instituted
nutrition labelling in restaurant mandates, it stands to reason that the national policy should
have an even more substantial effect.
The limited literature on supply-side effects of nutrition labelling in restaurants has
found small but significant improvements in the overall nutritional quality of menu items.
However, further research is necessary to examine the effects of the policy more broadly
and with respect to the recently implemented national policy.
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While few articles have examined the supply-side effects of mandatory calorie labeling,
a broader literature exists on the effects of quality disclosure. Dranove and Jin (2010)
conclude that the empirical literature finds little evidence that sellers respond to mandatory
quality disclosure by increasing quality.
Many studies find quality disclosure mandates to have their intended effect in raising
quality. Jin and Leslie (2003) find that restaurant provision of hygiene quality in the form
of a health card causes an increase in the average hygiene scores of restaurants. The result
applies to both voluntary and mandatory disclosure. Bennear and Olmstead (2008), using
a difference-in-difference approach, find that mandatory disclosure of water quality
reduces water quality violations. Ippolito and Mathios (1990) examine consumers and
producers’ decisions in the ready-to-eat cereal market under government-provided
information and advertising. They find that allowing firms to advertise about fiber contents
led to an increase in development of fiber cereals. While it is desirable for policymakers
that quality mandates improve quality, it is not always the case.
Several articles find that mandatory quality disclosure leads to unintended outcomes,
i.e., affected firms find ways to circumvent the law to their benefit. This is true across
industries: health care, education, and the environment. Dranove et al. (2003) argue that
the disclosure of patient health outcomes either at the physician or hospital level may lead
to selection bias, i.e., physicians/hospitals may refuse to treat severely ill patients or those
more difficult to treat. Lu (2012) examines the effect of the Nursing Home Quality
Initiative (NHQI) and finds that scores for reported dimensions of quality increase, while
the scores for unreported dimensions deteriorate such that overall quality does not improve.
Jacob (2005) examines the effect of the U.S. “No Child Left Behind” policy that requires
10

testing of students in grades 3-8. Mathematics and reading achievements increase
significantly after the implementation of the policy, strategic behaviors by teachers is also
observed such as focusing on test-specific skills, substituting lower stake subjects for high
stake ones, increasing special education placements, and preemptively retaining students.
Powers et al. (2011) find that disclosing environmental performance of individual pulp and
paper plants in India led to a significant reduction in pollution for the dirtiest plants, but
not for the cleaner ones. They found that plants located in wealthier communities were
more likely to reduce emissions as well as single-plant firms.
Overall, the literature on quality disclosure suggests that mandatory labeling of calorie
information may lead restaurants to reduce calories. Competitive effects may be such that
an increase in differentiation could be observed to soften price competition, i.e., an increase
in calories for some restaurants, and decrease in calories for others. In addition, the results
suggest that mandatory disclosure of calories could lead firms to alter other choice
variables (nutrition characteristics or other) to their benefit.
This paper seeks to add to the literature on quality disclosure in general and fast-food
restaurants’ responses to the national nutrition labelling mandate in specific. As such, we
analyze restaurants’ strategic response to the policy from a nutrition perspective.
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CHAPTER IV
DATA
This project entails a significant data collection effort to accurately represent the state
of nutrition at restaurants across the United States both big (20 or more locations, directly
affected by the policy) and small (less than 20 locations, not directly affected by the policy).
Restaurant menu offerings and their nutrition information are collected both prior to and
following the passage and implementation of the mandatory disclosure policy. Post
collection, the data require digitization and formatting before analyses can begin. Below,
we document the data collection and the data preparation process.
Data Collection Process
The project requires the use of a panel of detailed restaurant menu offerings and
nutrition information for each of the items offered. To form the sample of our large
restaurant chains, we draw restaurants from Nation’s Restaurant News, which ranks
restaurants based on their total sales. Out of the reported top 200 restaurants, we were able
to successfully collect data from 113 restaurants. The remaining restaurants either did not
report nutrition information before the policy took effect or reported it in a way that was
not conducive to collection (e.g. requiring going through several webpages for each menu
item.) Our resulting sample, as documented in Table 1 below, well represents all large
restaurant chains in the United States. As shown, the distribution of restaurants in our
sample matches those in the population of top restaurants reasonably well. This paper
focuses specifically on fast-food restaurants, those being restaurants identified as LSR
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limited-service restaurants) but also pizza, chicken, beverage-snack, and bakery-café. Of
which, there are 52 restaurants’ nutritional information in the dataset we analyze.
Our sample also includes a diverse mix of restaurants, not only in terms of their types
but also in terms of their total sales. Some restaurant chains on the top 200 list are very
large, such as number 1, McDonalds with 14,482 locations and over $38 trillion in sales
annually in the U.S. alone (McDonald’s Newsroom, 2015 and Nation’s Restaurant News,
2019). There are much smaller restaurants on the list such as number 197, Shari’s Café and
Pies with 96 locations and $170 million in sales annually (Marum, 2017 and Nation’s
Restaurant News, 2019). This feature allows us to study heterogeneous restaurant
responses to the policy along several dimensions.
For the restaurants in our sample, the data documents nutritional information on
macronutrients as well as serving sizes and various micronutrients. These include Total
Calories, Calories from Fat, Total fat (g), Saturated fat (g), Trans fat (g), Cholesterol (mg),
Sodium (mg), Total carbohydrates (g), Dietary fiber (g), Sugars (g), and Protein (g). These
are collected for each menu item in each restaurant in every time-period. Collectively, this
large set of longitudinal information makes it possible for detailed analysis of restaurants’
strategic response to the mandatory information disclosure.
This set of data has been collected for a total 23 distinct periods between March 2016
and October 2019, encompassing both before and after policy implementation.
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Table 1. Nation's Restaurant News Top 200 Proportion of Restaurants
by Segment
Pizza
LSR/Seafood
LSR/Noodle
LSR/Mexican
LSR/Italian
LSR/Hot Dog
LSR/Chinese
LSR/Burger
LSR/ Sandwich
LSR/ Japanese
LSR/ Cafeteria
LSR/ Barbecue
LSR/
In-Store
Family Dining/Grill- Buffet
Family Dining/Buffet
Family Dining
C-Store
Chicken
Casual Dining
Beverage- Snack
Bakery-Cafe
0%

5%

10%

15%

Proportion Available in our Sample
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20%

25%

Proportion in top 200

30%

35%

Digitization and Preparation Process
The data collected are formatted as images, with wildly different formats. Just as
restaurant menus come in all shapes and designs, so are the data in our sample.
Consequently, the natural next step is digitizing and formatting the data into a clean and
uniform format for analysis.
In order to deal with the heterogeneity and complexity of many restaurants’ individual
reporting mechanisms we have developed a multi-stage data cleaning process which uses
both automation and manual processes to efficiently clean large amounts of data.
The first stage in our data preparation process is scanning, where we take the data in
either HTML or PDF formats and converts it into a spreadsheet format. This step largely
relies on the use of optical character recognition (OCR) software, such as ABBYY. We
have been able to mostly automate this process using Python to convert the data in Excel
spreadsheets.
While converting images to spreadsheets is an important step, the data still need to
undergo careful and rigorous preparation before it is fit for analysis. In this next step, we
focus on cleaning the data such that all observations and variables have uniform formats
(e.g. all variables are listed horizontally, and observations listed vertically.) We have been
able to partially automate this process using Python, which dramatically reduces cleaning
time.
Finally, we move on to the most labor-intensive portion of the data cleaning process, a
final manual cleaning of data. At this stage we ensure that all the variables in our dataset
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are properly labelled, check for errors in scanning, and manually enter serving size
information that is specified in the item name.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS
Summary Statistics and Stylized Facts
Table 2. shows the average nutritional content of menu items at large American
fast-food restaurant chains over our collection period. This data only includes food items
and not most beverages, although it does include beverages intended wholly for dessert
e.g. milkshakes. It is apparent that there are outliers in data collection when looking at
some of the high maximum values present in some of the nutrients measured specifically
in the measurements of saturated fat, trans fat, cholesterol, and dietary fiber. For the most
part these measurement error outliers were not prevalent enough to substantially affect the
average measurement of the nutritional content of menu items and we are in the process of
identifying and correcting these few errors. The exception is saturated fat which appears to
be measured differently across restaurants, sometimes in grams and sometimes in
milligrams, and thus requires further examination before it can be used for analysis.
However, many of the high observations are reasonable. For example, the
maximum value of calories, 8,880 is for a tray of 64 brownies intended for a catering event.
For the most part, restaurants reported calories, total fat, sugar, sodium, and total
carbohydrates consistently. For that reason and their role as nutrients American’s
overconsume these are the variables we consider in our analysis.
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Table 3. shows how the nutritional makeup of the average menu item at U.S.
restaurants changed before and after the policy went into effect. It appears that the average
menu item became healthier in terms of calories, which is to say they contained about 25
fewer calories on average. That represents a reduction in calories of about one-sixth of the
average can of soda or one percent of the daily reference value of calories. One interesting
point of note is that the sodium content of the average menu item, which does not affect its
calories has fallen where one might expect it to increase to compensate for the decrease in
taste associated with a lower fat and sugar content.

Table 2. Nutritional Averages by Item Category per Menu Item
at U.S. Limited Service Restaurants with more than 20 locations, 2016-2019
Standard
Count
Mean
Deviation
Min
Max
Calories

143,908

440.7

406.0

0

8,880

Calories from Fat

123,400

184.7

219.0

0

5,400

Total Fat (g)

142,989

21.1

26.7

0

2,000

Saturated Fat (g)

117,434

1,194.6

10,189.7

0

710,710

Trans Fat (g)

128,411

21.8

242.4

0

7,030

Sugar (g)

133,011

20.9

33.3

0

1,230

Sodium (mg)

143,615

796.7

989.0

0

23,990

Cholesterol (mg)

142,724

80.1

237.8

0

15,900

Total Carbohydrates (g)

137,250

47.8

47.0

0

1,920

Dietary Fiber (g)

138,726

5.5

77.5

0

7,030

Protein (g)
138,768
16.4
20.8
0
472
Count indicates the number of individual items in the sample. Not every nutrient is
reported for every item in every time-period
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While it is interesting to look at the average calories of a menu item it may be
relevant to examine the nutrient composition by item categories, as in Table 4. That is,
which portion of the meal it is intended for. For fast-food restaurants items are usually
listed separately, the nutrition listed for entrées and sides separately instead of together as
a whole meal as they often are at full-service restaurants. A potentially surprising revelation
from this is that the average fried potato side dish contains as many calories as the entrée,
burger, or sandwich portion at fast-food restaurants.
Because of the periodic nature of our data collection process, we can observe not
only the changes in individual menu items but in the menu itself. That is, we can observe
when new items are added, old items are taken away, and items are reformulated to have
different nutritional content. For the purposes of analysis, we categorize the ways that a
restaurant menu can change from the entry, exit, and reformulation of menu items. The
average calories of menu items with these categorizations can be seen in Table 5. It is worth
noting that overall menus become healthier on average even when these changes would
appear to negatively affect healthfulness. Restaurants in general introduce new products
which are more calorific and did so to a greater extent after the policy went into effect.
Additionally, restaurants appear to be removing relatively less calorific items after the
policy. The reformulation variable is interesting because it encompasses two effects. One
is a selection effect i.e. restaurants may be choosing to reformulate relatively high calorie
products. The other is the effect of reformulation i.e. restaurants may be reformulating
products to have fewer calories
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Table 3. Restaurant Menu Change Between Average Nutrition per Menu Item at
U.S. Fast-Food Restaurants with more than 20 Locations Before and After
Nutrition Labelling Policy, 2016-2019

Calories
Calories from Fat
Total Fat (g)
Saturated Fat (g)
Trans Fat (g)
Sugar (g)
Sodium (mg)
Cholesterol (mg)
Total Carbohydrates (g)
Dietary Fiber (g)
Protein (g)

Pre-Policy,
May 2018
448.7
(418.9)
184.3
(229.0)
21.39
(28.59)
1207.0
(9250.7)
28.76
(282.7)
22.30
(34.94)
802.6
(1029.4)
81.36
(270.8)
49.12
(49.44)
6.365
(90.99)
16.37
(21.40)
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Post-Policy,
May 2018
423.5
(376.0)
185.7
(196.4)
20.52
(22.04)
1168.7
(11921.2)
7.563
(124.0)
17.89
(29.25)
783.7
(894.9)
77.29
(142.1)
44.86
(40.95)
3.568
(32.84)
16.44
(19.37)

Table 4. Nutritional Averages by Item Category per Menu Item
at U.S. Fast-Food Restaurants with more than 20 locations
Calories
382.8
(356.3)

Total Fat (g)
17.74
(23.73)

Sugar (g)
14.88
(26.58)

Sodium
(mg)
740.7
(893.9)

Baked Goods

302.9
(156.1)

13.80
(14.13)

19.72
(14.34)

313.1
(193.9)

Burgers

547.0
(276.5)

31.49
(19.74)

7.941
(6.613)

1062.1
(575.9)

Catering

1357.9
(1781.5)

78.41
(129.8)

37.65
(82.45)

2755.1
(3949.0)

Desserts

530.5
(342.6)

22.71
(20.74)

62.26
(41.75)

271.2
(266.2)

Entrées

564.9
(441.9)

27.72
(31.21)

11.27
(17.87)

1200.7
(1091.4)

Fried Potatoes

521.6
(440.8)

26.64
(28.91)

5.372
(12.17)

992.3
(969.8)

Kids

300.0
(221.9)

12.34
(15.52)

10.35
(15.00)

580.0
(565.7)

Sandwiches

609.0
(367.6)

28.18
(25.04)

7.874
(7.049)

1560.6
(1335.8)

Salads

262.0
(150.9)

12.47
(16.05)

5.855
(5.562)

1015.9
(514.5)

Soup

262.0
(150.9)

12.47
(16.05)

5.855
(5.562)

1015.9
(514.5)

Toppings &
Ingredients

127.9
(181.2)

8.627
(17.13)

7.229
(18.67)

265.3
(377.2)

Appetizers & Sides
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Table 5. Restaurant Menu Change Between Average Calories per Menu Item at U.S.
Fast-Food Restaurants with more than 20 locations Before and After Nutrition
Labelling Policy, 2016-2019
`
Constant Menu Item

Pre-Policy,
May 2018

Post-Policy,
May 2018

Description

450
383
80,455

408
361
39,026

Items which are present in both
the current period and a
subsequent period with no
changes to their calorie content
from the previous period.

Mean Calories
SD Calories
n

458
570
5,271

597
475
3,105

Items which are present the
current and future periods but not
any previous periods.

Mean Calories
SD Calories
n

461
452
5,148

414
328
1,528

Items which are present in the
current period but not any
subsequent period with no
changes to their calorie content.

472
802
2,469

558
345
166

Items which are not present in
any previous period nor any
subsequent period i.e. items
which are only observed once.

414
430
4,344

457
471
1,588

Items which are present in both a
previous period and a subsequent
period but with changes to their
calorie content from the previous
period.

288
591
759

544
300
49

Items which are present in the
current period but not any
subsequent period with changes
to their calorie content from the
previous period.

98,446

45,462

143,908

Mean Calories
SD Calories
n
Entry

Exit

Entry*Exit
Mean Calories
SD Calories
n
Reformulation
Mean Calories
SD Calories
n
Reformulation*Exit
Mean Calories
SD Calories
n
Total Sample Size

Note: In this table each observation is counted only once, i.e. there is no intersection between Entry, Exit,
and Entry*Exit.
The first observation for a restaurant is not counted as entry and the last not counted as exit.
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Reduced-Form Estimation
Overall, we are interested in the nutritional quality of menu items which can be
measured not just in calories but other nutritional characteristics such as fat, sugar,
carbohydrates, and sodium. Using variables described in Table 5. specifically, those related
to the menu changes Entry, Exit, Reformulation, and their interactions as explanatory
variables. Our main specification is:
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝜃 + 𝛽𝐷𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼(𝐷𝑠𝑡 × 𝐷𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝜉𝑖 + φ𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡

where the subscript i denotes the individual menu item. Subscript s denotes the
subset of the data, if the observation fell into one of the categories previously discussed.
Subscript t denotes time representing the collection period. Yist is the measure of the nutrient
on question: calories, total fat, sugar, carbohydrates, or sodium. Dst is a dummy variable
which takes the value 1 if the menu item has changed in one of the previously discussed
ways in that period and 0 otherwise, and Dt a dummy which takes the value 1 if the
observation is after the time that the policy went into effect and 0 otherwise. Thus, (Ds x
Dt) takes the value of 1 if the menu item experienced a change after the policy went into
effect and 0 otherwise. ξ, φ, and τ represent fixed effects. ξ is the restaurant segment fixed
effect following the designations discussed in Table 1. φ captures item category fixed
effects as discussed in Table 4. τ captures fixed effects by month including seasonality. εist,
captures any random shocks.
Table 6. shows the results of this estimation, we have controlled for month,
restaurant segment, and food-category fixed effects to ensure that these results are not
driven by seasonality or specialization. When firms introduced new menu items, Entry,
they generally had higher calories, fat, sugar, and sodium content than other items on the
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menu. This effect was even greater after the policy, Entry*Post, except for sugar content
where newly introduced products had marginally lower the sugar content. In general, the
elimination of products, Exit, resulted in less healthy products being eliminated. Although
after the policy went into effect there were few additional effects on the elimination of
products, Exit*Post shows no strong pattern. The exception once again is sugar where after
the policy, controlling for fixed effects, restaurants were eliminating products with a
marginally lower sugar content on average. Generally, restaurants introduced new products
which were less healthful but also eliminated less healthful products.
Turning now to our measure of reformulation in Table 6. this variable describes a
menu item which had a change to calorie content from the previous observation. Thus, it
captures two effects, first is the actual effect of reformulation, how the product changed
from the previous period to the current period. However, it also captures a selection effect,
that is the effect of restaurants choosing which products to reformulate. It could, therefore,
be the case that fast-food restaurants were choosing high calorie products to reformulate
and reformulating them to have lower calories after the policy went into effect. We further
explore this hypothesis in the analysis presented in Table 7.
In Table 7. I analyze a modified dataset from that presented in Table 6. wherein we
asses only data for reformulated products in the period after their reformulation and one
period before their reformulation. As such, this analysis seeks to capture only the
reformulation effect and not the selection effect of fast-food restaurants changing the
nutritional content of their products. This analysis reveals some interesting patterns. Before
the implementation of the policy fast-food restaurants focused mainly on reformulating
products to be lower in sugar and fat however, these reformulations did not significantly
24

affect the calorie content of menu items. After the implementation of the policy restaurants
shifted the focus of their reformulations towards decreasing calories. While fat and sugar
were decreased to a lower extent they were still generally decreased on average.
Furthermore, carbohydrates were also substantially decreased.
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Table 6. Effects of Limited Service Restaurant Action on Nutritional Quality of
Menu Items at U.S. Fast-Food Restaurants with more than 20 locations Before and
After Nutrition Labelling Policy (May 2018), 2016-2019
(1)
Calories

(2)
Total Fat
(g)

(3)
Sugar
(g)

(4)
Carbohydrates (g)

(5)
Sodium
(mg)

44.03***
(5.184)
111.6***
(8.596)
47.82***
(5.191)
-3.203
(10.68)
-48.92***
(10.33)
-50.15
(31.76)
-5.124
(5.720)
37.93***
(10.79)
-118.6***
(15.06)
126.6*
(54.74)
-12.44***
(2.486)
243.3***
(6.344)

2.266***
(0.363)
7.186***
(0.602)
2.776***
(0.363)
-0.487
(0.746)
3.858***
(0.723)
-9.716***
(2.220)
0.384
(0.401)
1.245
(0.755)
-8.116***
(1.053)
8.067*
(3.825)
-0.987***
(0.174)
7.717***
(0.447)

1.249***
(0.362)
-1.319*
(0.607)
1.812***
(0.372)
-2.411**
(0.758)
0.538
(0.730)
14.33***
(2.213)
1.325***
(0.401)
-1.645*
(0.759)
3.822***
(1.064)
-1.540
(3.775)
-1.025***
(0.177)
6.365***
(0.453)

4.894***
(0.612)
6.316***
(1.008)
2.552***
(0.607)
1.400
(1.250)
-5.327***
(1.219)
5.119
(3.868)
-3.143***
(0.692)
5.263***
(1.278)
-15.49***
(1.788)
17.48**
(6.475)
-2.500***
(0.296)
32.03***
(0.743)

73.09***
(12.46)
236.7***
(20.72)
28.59*
(12.48)
62.79*
(25.65)
-68.72**
(24.83)
-245.0**
(76.32)
-75.44***
(13.77)
200.6***
(26.05)
-389.9***
(36.34)
404.8**
(131.6)
-22.30***
(5.978)
308.1***
(15.25)

Month,
Restaurant, and
Food Category
Fixed Effects

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

n

143,907

142,988

133,010

137,249

143,614

Entry
Entry*Post
Exit
Exit*Post
Entry*Exit
Entry*Exit
*Post
Reformulation
Reformulation*
Post
Reformulation*
Exit
Reformulation*
Exit*Post
Post
Constant

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05

** p<0.01

***p<0.001
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Table 7. Effects of Reformulation on Calories of Menu Items at U.S. Fast-Food
Restaurants with more than 20 locations Before and After Nutrition Labelling
Policy (May 2018), 2016-2019
(1)

Reformulation
Reformulation*
Post
Post
Constant
Month,
Restaurant, and
Food Category
Fixed Effects
n

Calories
2.814
(12.94)
-58.98*
(24.42)
80.98***
(22.29)
406.0***
(33.35)

(2)
Total Fat
(g)
-9.253***
(1.247)
6.579**
(2.350)
-7.087***
(2.146)
20.82***
(3.222)

(3)
Sugar
(g)
-3.791***
(0.796)
1.356
(1.502)
-4.664***
(1.367)
15.55***
(2.055)

(4)
Carbohydrates (g)
-1.235
(1.398)
-7.362**
(2.553)
6.618**
(2.346)
52.46***
(3.467)

(5)
Sodium
(mg)
80.94**
(29.88)
-169.6**
(56.44)
301.8***
(51.47)
569.3***
(77.06)

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

8,606

8,572

8,288

8,046

8,558

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05
** p<0.01

*** p<0.001
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
Strategic Response of Fast-Food Restaurants
While this reduced-form analysis can hardly reveal a causal effect of the policy the
patterns it shows in restaurants actions do imply some interesting strategic responses by
restaurants to nutrition labelling policy. First it would appear that if the policy has had its
desired effect in reducing calorie content of fast-food menu items, this effect resulted in a
reduction of at most only about 25 calories per menu item, one percent of the DRV.
The three broad ways in which restaurants can alter the nutritional profile of their
menus are introduction (entry), elimination (exit), and reformulation of menu items. Newly
introduced products were substantially less healthful than other products and even more so
after nutrition labelling in restaurants was mandated. While before the policy fast-food
restaurants eliminated less healthful products this pattern did not substantially change after
the introduction of the policy. Fast-food restaurants reformulated items to be healthier in
general and especially so after the policy.
One potentially interesting explanation for these phenomena could be that
restaurants are responding to consumers who desire healthful products but are poorly
informed about nutrition. As such, restaurants strategies could entail marginally
reformulating popular existing menu items to be marginally lower in calories and other
overconsumed nutrients. However, at the same time introducing new products which are
substantially higher in calories to serve as comparisons. Consumers who care about
reducing their calorie intake will thus interpret existing menu items to be more healthful
by comparison to newer items. However, this profit maximizing response could be
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intended solely to appeal to consumers different preferences with regards to taste and
nutrition. Even if this strategic response is the case, fast-food restaurants may have still
provided healthier options and potentially reduced calorie consumption so the policy could
still be interpreted as successful.
Limitations
We see many potential limitations with this initial analysis. First, while it is
generally hard to establish causal impacts of a policy change, it is particularly challenging
in our case. Restaurants exist in a complex market, each selling hundreds of different
products and having a diverse range of specializations.
Additionally, restaurants as well as consumer preferences constantly evolve over
time, so it is important to control for time trend. Furthermore, the distinction between
pre- and post-policy period becomes more subtle given that the policy was announced
and later postponed (Bokamp, 2017).
Another limitation is that our data is only on nutrition of menu items, with no
sales information. This makes it difficult to evaluate the policy impacts on health. To
counter this limitation, we take advantage of the fact that restaurants themselves observe
sales and are likely to take that into consideration when making decisions related to the
nutritional content of their products. Restaurants are likely to (1) drop items in low
demand, (2) add items which they think will have high demand and (3) reformulate
products to have higher demand than previously. Thus, by looking at product entry, exit
and reformulation, we can also infer about popularity and sales.
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While there are limitations to the current analysis, we hope to counter them with
more robust analyses in the future.
Extensions
We have gathered a rich panel dataset on a representative subset of U.S. restaurants’
nutritional profiles. As such, the analysis presented in this paper is intended to serve as an
initial exploration of this data. We intend to add more data to this analysis and expand our
empirical methods to capture the causal effect of this policy more accurately.
The obvious next step is to add more data to the analysis. First, we can add data
for sit-down restaurants with more than 20 locations. It could be interesting to see if there
is a differential effect across these two broad categories of restaurants.
Furthermore, we have collected data on restaurants with fewer than 20 locations
which are not directly mandated to follow the policy. To properly identify the policy
impact, we will consider and compare restaurants with 20 or more locations (subject to
policy) vs. those with less than 20 locations (not subject to policy). We believe that time
trend is likely to be comparable across groups within each dimension, so difference-indifferences estimates would allow us to tease out common time trend unrelated to the
policy.
While a broader look at restaurants could certainly be interesting another avenue of
exploration is to take a more focused look at specific groups of restaurant chains and
specific menu item categories. This could reveal patterns in strategic responses across these
groups.
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Additionally, it may be fruitful to develop a structural model of restaurant menu
decisions from a nutritional standpoint. To this end, we seek to develop a robust model of
supply-side forces which influence nutrition decisions by restaurants. This will further
allow us to describe the causal effects of the policy and estimate welfare effects.
Furthermore, the distinction of the policy being in effect simply after it was enacted in
May 2018 (Post) is naïve. The policy was postponed multiple times (Bokamp, 2017). It is
likely that restaurants strategic responses began earlier than the enaction of the policy. A
more robust temporal analysis would allow us to capture the dynamic impacts over time,
and properly evaluate the impact of actual policy vs. policy threat.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
Nutrition labelling in restaurants is a policy designed to inform consumers of the
nutritional quality of the food they consume. As a result of this policy restaurants may
choose to alter the nutritional content of their menu items. This thesis has sought to address
fast-food restaurants’ strategic response to the mandate to label calorie content on their
menus and menu boards. Given the importance of food away from home and specifically
fast-food to American diets this response could have major consequences for American
public health.
Consumer responses to nutrition labelling are quite well documented in previous
literature and find that consumers respond to them by reducing the number of calories they
purchase but these responses vary demographically (Bollinger, Leslie, and Sorenson, 2010;
Ebel, Kersh. Brescoll, and Dixon, 2009; Green, Brown, and Ohri-Vachaspati, 2015;
Yamamoto et al. 2004). The limited research on the effects of nutrition labelling on
restaurants food offerings is limited but generally finds that restaurants slightly reduce the
calorie content of their menu items (Breummer, Krieger, Salens, and Chan, 2012; Nambla
et al. 2013). The broader literature on quality disclosure finds that firms’ strategic responses
to quality disclosure mandates can have intended and unintended consequences (Bennear
and Olmstead ,2008; Dranove et al. ,2003; Ippolito and Mathios, 1990; Jacob, 2005; Jin
and Leslie ,2003; Lu ,2012; Powers et al., 2011).
This paper contributes primarily to the literature regarding firms’ strategic responses to
nutrition labelling policy. Specifically addressing the recent nationally mandated nutrition
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labelling policy for a large number of major fast-food restaurant chains. We find evidence
of calorie reductions in average menu items across these restaurants, consistently with
previous literature.
Holistically assessing the various patterns in the ways that restaurants can change the
nutritional profile of their menus, through introduction, elimination, and reformulation of
menu items suggests intended and unintended consequences of this policy. If the policy
has been successful in reducing the average calorie content of menu items, it would only
have resulted in at most a modest reduction of 25 calories per item on average. This may
have been accomplished through the reformulation of existing menu items to be more
healthful, especially since the enaction of the policy, and elimination of particularly
unhealthy items. However, while restaurants have altered their menus towards a lowercalorie, fat, sugar, carbohydrate, and sodium composition they have also introduced new
products which are particularly unhealthful. This introduction of unhealthful products
increased in severity after the implementation of the policy. This suggests that fast-food
restaurants may be appealing to consumers who care only for taste and/or magnifying the
effect of their meager improvements to the existing menu with particularly unhealthy
comparisons.
Further research will seek to disaggregate a causal effect of the policy from general
trends. Additionally, we seek to identify patterns of response across a broader range of
restaurant sizes and specialties as well as focus on specific responses of groups of
restaurants. In so doing we will identify restaurants’ strategic and competitive responses to
the mandate to label calorie content of menu items on their menus and menu boards more
accurately.
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